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THE CAPACITY OF FOREIGN SOVEREIGNS TO MAINTAIN
PRIVATE FEDERAL ANTITRUST ACTIONS
Large-scale antitrust suits recently initiated by consumers against
members of the pharmaceutical industry for price fixing' have prompted
nine foreign sovereigns, 2 which had purchased quantities of antibiotics
from the defendant drug manufacturers, to become plaintiffs in similar
antitrust actions. The appearance of foreign sovereigns in the Antibiotic
Drug litigation marks one of the first times in which non-domestic gov-
ernmental entities have sought United States antitrust relief.'
The Antibiotic Drug cases include over 150 civil antitrust damage
actions brought by a number of different categories of plaintiffs, includ-
ing the federal government, states of the United States, wholesalers and
retailers, private hospitals, agricultural purchasers, insurance compa-
nies, and competitors.4 Almost all the suits have been settled except for
those instituted by foreign sovereigns and a few others. The continuing
1. See In re Antibiotic Drugs, 320 F. Supp. 586 (J.P.M.L. 1970). Many of the more than
150 plaintiffs involved in this series of antitrust actions against members of the pharma-
ceutical industry filed as class representatives.
2. Republic of the Philippines, Imperial Government of Iran, Republic of Vietnam,
State of Kuwait, Government of India, Republic of West Germany, Government of Spain,
Government of Columbia, and the Republic of South Korea.
3. Kuwait v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 333 F. Supp. 315, 316 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). Previously,
Israel and possibly India filed claims for private antitrust relief as part of the Electrical
Equipment Co. cases. When Foreign Nations Sue Under Antitrust, Bus. WEEK, Feb. 24,
1975, at 26. For a history of the Electrical Equipment Co. cases, see C. BANE, THE ELECTRI-
CAL EQUIPMENT CONSPIRACIES (1973). In India's case the named plaintiff was the Damodar
Valley Corporation, an Indian corporation which the defendants claimed was "the Repub-
lic of India acting in the guise of a corporation." Kuwait v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., supra, at
316 n.3. Defendants' motion to dismiss the corporation's suit was overruled, but since the
basis of that decision was not articulated the ruling lacks precedential value. Id. Israel's
claim was never litigated and was apparently settled out of court.
A foreign sovereign and foreign political subdivision maintained common law unfair
competition and trade-name infringement suits in the U.S. many years ago. French Re-
public v. Saratoga Vichy Co., 191 U.S. 427 (1903); La Republique Francaise v. Schultz,
94 F. 500 (S.D.N.Y. 1899), aff'd, 102 F.153 (2d Cir. 1900); Carlsbad v. Schultz, 78 F. 469
(S.D.N.Y. 1897); Carlsbad v. Kutnow, 68 F. 794 (S.D.N.Y. 1895), aff'd, 71 F. 167 (2d Cir.
1895).
In contrast to foreign nations and subdivisions, the federal government, states of the
United States, and political subdivisions of states have invoked civil antitrust remedies
in federal courts for some time. See, e.g., United States v. Ward Baking Co., 376 U.S. 327
(1964); Georgia v. Evans, 316 U.S. 159 (1942); Chattanooga Foundry & Pipe Works v.
Atlanta, 203 U.S. 390 (1906).
4. For the background and history of the Antibiotic Drug litigation see Pfizer Inc. v.
Lord, 456 F.2d 532 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 976 (1972).
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litigation between the defendant drug manufacturers and the complain-
ing foreign governments is partially due to the uncertainty surrounding
the right of this particular class of plaintiffs to maintain private anti-
trust actions.
This question has been a point of contention in two Antibiotic Drug
cases involving Kuwait5 and the Philippines,' and both the plaintiffs7
and the United States8 have argued that the foreign governments should
be entitled to sue. The Eighth Circuit, however, has recently dismissed
an appeal on this point 9 on procedural grounds,'0 and thus the right of
foreign sovereigns to maintain treble damage actions under the federal
antitrust laws" has not been decided authoritatively. As a result, a
potential liability of United States corporations to foreign governments
5. Kuwait v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 333 F. Supp. 315 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). The Kuwait deci-
sion is discussed in Note, 5 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 531 (1972). Convinced that a domestic
conspiracy to reduce competition has an adverse effect in the United States, and conclud-
ing that Congress did not intend to prevent a foreign government which purchased price-
fixed commodities from utilizing the same treble-damage remedy available to foreign
corporations, the District Court in that case held that Kuwait was a "person" within the
meaning of § 4 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970), and was entitled to maintain
suit. An interlocutory appeal was certified by the District Court and granted by the
Second Circuit, but an intervening settlement resulted in dismissal of the appeal without
prejudice. BNA ANITR. & TRADE REG. REP., No. 697, A-23 (Jan. 21, 1975).
6. Order No. 74-31 (D. Minn. 1974), cited in BNA ANTrrR. & TRADE REG. REP., No. 697,
A-23 (Jan. 21, 1975). In this order, Minnesota District Judge Miles Lord permitted the
Republic of the Phillippines to maintain its treble-damage antitrust suit against the
defendants, relying on his earlier decision in Kuwait v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 333 F. Supp.
315 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
7. The plaintiff in Kuwait relied upon "a long line of cases which allow foreign sover-
eigns to maintain actions in United States Courts." Kuwait v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 333 F.
Supp. 315, 316 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
8. The United States in an amicus curiae brief argued that "foreign nations, as a matter
of good foreign policy, should be given the protection of our antitrust laws." Kuwait v.
Chas. Pfizer & Co., 333 F. Supp. 315, 316 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). The United States also submit-
ted an amicus curiae brief in support of the foreign sovereign position in Pfizer, Inc. v.
Lord, 522 F.2d 612 (8th Cir. 1975). See note 9 infra.
9. Pfizer, Inc. v. Lord, 522 F.2d 612 (8th Cir. 1975). The drug manufacturers had sought
review of Judge Lord's order in the Philippine case, supra note 6, by requesting the lower
court to certify the order for interlocutory appeal. The request was denied, however,
presumably because of the precedential effect of Judge Lord's earlier decision in Kuwait
v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 333 F. Supp. 315 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). Following this denial, the
defendants sought review through a writ of mandamus.
10. The Eighth Circuit never reached the merits of the issue because of its determina-
tion that mandamus did not lie to review the ruling of the District Court. Pfizer, Inc. v.
Lord, 522 F.2d 612, 614 (8th Cir. 1975). The court also held that a foreign sovereign could
not sue as parens patriae on behalf of its individual and corporate citizens.
11. It is interesting although unclear, and in the final analysis unimportant, whether
this issue is framed as a standing question or a capacity to sue determination. Both terms
are used interchangeably in this Note.
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amounting to many millions of dollars is presently unresolved.,2 This
Note will review the pertinent antitrust statutory material, case law,
and policies relating to foreign sovereign antitrust actions and, based on
these considerations, will offer a tentative resolution of this contro-
versy. 3
I
THE STATUTORY AND DECISIONAL SETTING
There is no statutory litmus test for determining whether or not for-
eign sovereigns have the right to maintain private antitrust actions.
Section 4 of the Clayton Act'" grants the right to sue to any "person"
injured in his business or property by acts forbidden under the antitrust
laws, and the Act's definition of "person" includes "corporations or
associations" authorized by the laws of the United States, its territories,
"or the laws of any foreign country. 1 5 Thus, whether foreign sovereigns
may maintain private antitrust actions depends upon whether or not
they are "persons" under these provisions.
Generally, foreign nations recognized by the United States are enti-
tled to sue on contracts and vindicate property rights in United States
courts. 6 The basis of this privilege rests upon the notion of international
comity; 7 our courts, however, are not obliged to grant foreign states the
12. For example, one of the nine foreign sovereigns which asserted antitrust claims in
the Antibiotic Drug cases speculated that it suffered actual damages in the area of $10
million, which would be trebled if proven. When Foreign Nations Sue Under Antitrust,
Bus. WEEK, Feb. 24, 1975, at 26.
13. This Note assumes that U.S. federal courts have requisite jurisdiction over the
issues and parties of the antitrust suits under consideration. Jurisdiction over the litigated
issues and the parties, are, of course, crucial threshold questions. See W. FUGATE, FOREIGN
COMMERCE AND THE ANTITRUST LAWS (1973) for a comprehensive analysis of the jurisdic-
tional bases of U.S. antitrust law. State antitrust laws are not within the scope of this
Note.
14. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970).
15. 15 U.S.C. § 12, para. 3 (1970).
16. The judicial power of the United States extends to controversies "between a State,
or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects." U.S. CONST. art. lI, § 2
(emphasis added). See The Sapphire, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 164 (1870); Honduras v. Soto,
112 N.Y. 310, 19 N.E. 845 (1899).
17. Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 277 (1839). Comity has been defined as
that "reciprocal courtesy which one member of the family of nations owes to the others."
Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic v. Cibrario, 235 N.Y. 255, 257, 139 N.E. 259,
260 (1923). Another court has said:
What is termed comity of nations is the formal expression and ultimate result of
that mutual respect accorded throughout the civilized world by representatives
of each sovereign power to those of every other, in considering the effects of their
official acts. Its source is a sentiment of reciprocal regard, founded on identity of
position and similarity of institutions.
1975]
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right to sue under all circumstances."8 Customary international practice
need not be followed in those instances where there are compelling rea-
sons for not permitting foreign sovereigns to invoke the benefits of U.S.
law.
Because U.S. antitrust law is a statutory creation, the right to main-
tain an antitrust suit is statutorily conferred. Since neither the Clayton
Act nor the policy of comity dictates a resolution of the issue, the ques-
tion of whether foreign governments may obtain civil antitrust relief
depends upon a panoply of more subtle factors. As the Supreme Court
has reasoned:
The purpose, the subject matter, the context, the legislative history, and
the executive interpretation, of the [antitrust] statute are aids to con-
struction which may indicate intent, by use of the term ["person"], to
bring state or nation within the scope of the law."
While a body of case law precedent is often a persuasive, if not man-
datory, basis from which to decide a legal issue, the only case touching
upon foreign sovereign antitrust suits on the merits is the Kuwait deci-
sion. The brevity of the Kuwait opinion and its cursory analysis suggests
that the decision is neither a definitive treatment of, nor necessarily the
better view on, this issue.2' Proper examination entails a more complete
analysis of the analogous case law precedent, the legislative history of
the antitrust laws, antitrust policy, and political and diplomatic consid-
erations.
Fisher Brown & Co. v. Fielding, 67 Conn. 91, 108, 34 A. 714, 716 (1895).
18. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 408-409 (1964). The Supreme
Court has called "comity" in the legal sense "neither a matter of absolute obligation, on
one hand, nor of mere courtesy or good will, on the other." Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113,
163-64 (1895). Thus, for example, unrecognized foreign governments may not maintain
law suits in U.S. courts. Guaranty Trust Co. v. United States, 304 U.S. 126,136-41 (1938);
Federal Republic of Germany v. Elicofon, 358 F. Supp. 747 (E.D.N.Y. 1972), aff'd, 478
F.2d 231 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 931 (1974); accord, Banco Nacional de Cuba
v. Sabbatino, supra, at 408-12. See Lubman, The Unrecognized Government in American
Courts: Upright v. Mercury Business Machines, 62 COLUM. L. REv. 275 (1962). The same
holds true for governments at war with the United States. Ex parte Colonna, 314 U.S. 510
(1942).
19. United States v. Cooper Corp., 312 U.S. 600, 605 (1941).
20. See note 5 supra. The Kuwait court was so troubled by the difficulties posed by this
question that it stated there was "substantial ground for difference of opinion" so as to
permit an interlocutory appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1970). Kuwait v. Chas.
Pfizer & Co., 333 F. Supp. 315, 317 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
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II
FACTORS INFLUENCING THE OUTCOME
A. ANALOGOUS CASE LAW PRECEDENT
There have been two leading cases analyzing the right of governmen-
tal entities to obtain civil antitrust relief. In 1941, the Supreme Court
held in United States v. Cooper Corp.' that the federal government
could not maintain a treble-damage antitrust action. The following
year, the Court held in Georgia v. Evans2 that individual states of the
United States may obtain such relief.
2 3
The Cooper Court in denying private antitrust relief to the United
States emphasized that the federal government was in possession of
three express methods for enforcing U.S. antitrust law: criminal prose-
cution, injunction, and forfeiture. It was thought unlikely that Congress
implicitly gave the United States a civil remedy for antitrust wrongs
perpetrated against it as well. The Court reasoned:
It seems evident that the Act envisaged two classes of actions-those
made available only to the Government, which are first provided in
detail, and, in addition, a right of action for treble damages granted to
redress private injury.1
The Cooper majority also pointed out that the Court ordinarily took
a narrow view when interpreting the antitrust laws,n and thus lack of
express congressional authorization precluded the finding of any im-
plicit right to sue. 26
21. 312 U.S. 600 (1941).
22. 316 U.S. 159 (1942).
23. These two cases interpreted § 7 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1970),
forerunner of the present § 4 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1970). Section 7,
repealed by Act of July 7, 1955, ch. 282, § 3, 69 Stat. 282, applied to violations of the
Sherman Act, while § 4 of the Clayton Act, presently in effect, covers violations of all
federal antitrust laws. Otherwise, the two provisions contain virtually identical language.
24. 312 U.S. 600, 608 (1941).
25. For example, initially only the federal government had express authorization to
utilize injunctive relief to halt antitrust violations, and the Supreme Court held in
Minnesota v. Northern Securities Co., 194 U.S. 48 (1904), that similar relief was not
extended to private suitors since it was not expressly authorized. Legislation has since
reversed the Northern Securities result. See 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1970).
26. In 1955 Congress enacted legislation permitting the United States the right to
obtain actual damages for injuries sustained as a result of antitrust violations. 15 U.S.C.
§ 15a (1970). The Senate Report of the bill noted that the remedial amendment was
necessary because of the vast amount of federal government procurement expenditures,
and that the government deserved redress when economically injured by antitrust viola-
tors. S. RP. No. 619, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1955). The Committee agreed with the
Cooper decision in that the treble damage 'emedy for the United States was inappropriate
19751
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In Georgia v. Evans, the Court distinguished Cooper on the ground
that without the civil damage remedy the State of Georgia, as distin-
guished from the federal government, would be left without methods to
redress injuries suffered as a result of federal antitrust violations. Justice
Frankfurter for the majority stated:
Nothing in the Act, its history, or its policy, could justify so restrictive a
construction of the word "person" in § 7 as to exclude a State. Such a
construction would deny all redress to a State, when mulcted by a viola-
tion of the Sherman Law merely because it is a State.Y
The Court also thought that a state should not be treated differently
than its political subdivisions. It had earlier held that local municipali-
ties are entitled to maintain private treble-damage actions;"8 a contrary
holding in Georgia v. Evans would have been anomalous.
B. SIMILARITY WITH THE UNITED STATES
It can be argued that a foreign sovereign is much more closely akin
to the United States than to an individual state and hence should not
be allowed to maintain a private antitrust action absent curative legisla-
tion. The key factor in the Cooper decision denying the federal govern-
ment a civil damage remedy was that the United States possessed many
alternative techniques for enforcing its antitrust laws without having to
resort to the civil damage remedy for protection. By virtue of its sover-
eignty, a foreign government has substantial control over its domestic
economic and commercial affairs. In order to protect itself and its peo-
ple, a foreign government may impose its own antitrust laws which can
be as stringent as, or even harsher than, United States antitrust law,2"
because "it would be wholly improper to write into the statute a provision whose chief
purpose is to promote the institution of proceedings." Id.
27. 316 U.S. 159, 162-63 (footnote omitted).
28. Chattanooga Foundry & Pipe Works v. Atlanta, 203 U.S. 390 (1906).
29. For example, until recently the maximum criminal penalty for a corporation violat-
ing §§ 1 or 2 of the Sherman Act has been a $50,000 misdemeanor fine, whereas corpora-
tions found violating the antitrust provisions of the Treaty Establishing the European
Economic Community, done March 25, 1957, art. 85, can be fined 10 percent of their total
sales for the preceding business year for all products, not just those goods which are the
subject of the complaint. Reg. 17, art. 15(2), see CCH COMM. MKT. REP. $ 2541 (1972).
Also, the French antitrust laws, in particular, prohibit certain refusals to sell which would
be lawful under U.S. law. See CCH DOING Bus. IN EUROPE 23,023 (1974). See also Rahl,
American Antitrust and Foreign Operations: What is Covered?, 8 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 1-2
(1974). As one former Justice Department official recently wrote, "we should expect that
other nations and communities will use their antitrust laws to protect their
consumers against those who restrain competition in their markets." Baker, Antitrust and
World Trade: Tempest in an International Teapot?, 8 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 16, 41 (1974)
(emphasis in original).
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and can also use other controls over its commerce, such as pricing,
import, and tariff regulation. Thus, in one way it appears redundant and
unnecessary to protect other sovereign governments.
The Evans decision, according to this view, can be distinguished on
the ground that individual states do not possess protectionist powers
within the capability of foreign governments, having long ago relin-
quished such power to the federal government." This factor of enforce-
ment capacity also distinguishes foreign sovereigns from other foreign
purchasers, who are unquestionably permitted to sue for private anti-
trust relief. 13
The analogy of foreign sovereigns to the United States, however, is
easily deflatable. The preexisting duty of the federal government to
pursue antitrust violators, whether or not it has been directly injured,
makes such incentives as treble damages and attorney's fees superfluous
to it alone. This analysis does not apply to foreign sovereigns, for they
have neither a preexisting duty to sue nor any incentive to sue for anti-
trust relief other than monetary reward. Injunctive remedies would gen-
erally not be of value to them.12 They would be effectively without U.S.
antitrust remedies if denied the right to assert the treble-damage action.
Other considerations militate in favor of this position as well: the fact
that they have their own antitrust laws, for example, should be irrele-
vant. States of the United States have their own antitrust laws,33 yet
they may maintain federal antitrust suits. Furthermore, foreign sover-
eigns have even more reason to need monetary incentives than conven-
tional antitrust complainants. Formidable and expensive discovery
problems 34 and diplomatic considerations are encountered by foreign
sovereigns which domestic plaintiffs do not face.
30. The federal government's power over economic affairs is contained in several sec-
tions of the Constitution, including the Supremacy Clause, the Commerce Clause, and
the clause authorizing duties on imports. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl.2; art. I, § 8, cl.3; art. I,
§ 10, cl.2.
31. The same reasoning applies to political subdivisions of foreign nations. Just as
central foreign governments are generally treated as responsible for the acts of their
political subdivisions, see 119 CONG. REC. 2213 (1973) (comment of the Attorney General),
so should these political subdivisions be treated the same as their central governments
for purposes of antitrust standing.
32. The injunctive relief provisions which can be invoked by civil antitrust plaintiffs
would be of little use to foreign sovereigns which had already completed their contracts
with U.S. price-fixing corporations by the time antitrust violations were discovered.
33. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 6-4-101 through 6-4-109 (1974); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 542.01-.12 (1973); VA. CONST. art. 12, § 165.
34. See Doyle, Taking Evidence by Deposition and Letters Rogatory and Obtaining
Documents in Foreign Territory, 1959 A.B.A. SECTION OF INT'L & Comp. L. PROCEEDINGS
37; Emerglich, Antitrust Jurisdiction and the Production of Documents Located Abroad,
11 RECORD OF THE N.Y.C.B.A. 122 (1956); Note, Subpoena of Documents Located in
19751
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C. LEGISLATIVE INTENT
The most effective argument that can be made against permitting
foreign sovereign antitrust suits is that there was no such legislative
intent. Nowhere in the legislative history of the antitrust laws is there
any indication that Congress contemplated foreign governments assert-
ing treble-damage actions; conversely, there is much in the legislative
history militating against foreign sovereigns becoming antitrust suitors.
The original Sherman Act was principally authored by Senator Hoar,
who apparently envisioned a rather narrow "person" provision which
excluded foreign sovereigns."
When Congress enacted the Clayton Act to deal effectively with mon-
opolistic practices not covered by the Sherman Act, it originally circum-
scribed the limits of who could assert treble damage claims with appar-
ent exactitude. Foreign sovereigns did not fall within the Act's ambit;
indeed, the first version of the Act implicitly excluded all non-
individuals and nonbusiness entities from maintaining treble damage
suits.3
Despite the above arguments, at best it can be said that the legislative
history of the antitrust laws is inconclusive as to foreign sovereign suit-
ors. Throughout the hearings and debates foreign sovereigns were never
expressly made ineligible or even mentioned at all, and deriving legisla-
tive intent from Congressional silence is a dubious proposition."
Foreign Jurisdictions Where Law of Situs Prohibits Removal, 37 N.Y.U.L. REV. 295
(1962); Note, Ordering Production of Documents from Abroad in Violation of Foreign Law,
31 U. CHI. L. REv. 791 (1964); Note, Discovery of Documents Located Abroad, 14 VA. J.
INT'L L. 747 (1974).
35. Senator Hoar, who is credited with being the true father of the Sherman Act, A.
WALKER, HISTORY OF THE SHERMAN LAW OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 27-28 (1910),
criticized Senator Sherman's original bill as failing to provide effective remedies "except
so far as it gave power to private citizens to bring suit for private damages." 21 CONG.
REc. 2567 (1890) (remarks of Senator Hoar) (emphasis added). When he rewrote the bill,
however, Senator Hoar did not enlarge upon the scope of who may be a private antitrust
suitor. WALKER, supra, at 330-31.
36. H.R. 15657, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. (1914) did not define "person" but allowed the right
to sue to "any person, copartnership, association, or corporation. . . ." Later, the House
Judiciary Committee revised the Act to refer to "persons" and then defined that term
separately in § 1. See note 15 supra and accompanying text. The change appeared to be
entirely for structural purposes and no substantive change in scope appears to have been
intended from what Congressman Clayton originally proposed. Joint Brief for Petitioners-
Appellants at 20-22, Pfizer, Inc. v. Lord, 522 F.2d 612 (8th Cir. 1975).
37. See Girouard v. United States, 328 U.S. 61, 69 (1946); Helvering v. Hallock, 309
U.S. 106, 119-20 (1940).
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D. ANTITRUST POLICY
1. Maximizing the Incentive to Sue
The basic policies underlying the private treble damage remedy pro-
vide strong support for foreign sovereign antitrust suitors, and oversha-
dow the semantic ambiguities inherent in a legislative history uncon-
cerned with foreign sovereigns.
Potential antitrust violators are deterred from committing proscribed
acts because they know that their victims can recover three times the
amount of their damages plus costs and attorney's fee. 8 The treble-
damage action thus has a result orientation making private claimants
"private attorneys general" who supplement Justice Department and
Federal Trade Commission enforcement mechanisms.39 These policies
behind the treble-damage action would be furthered by permitting all
classes of juristic entities, including foreign sovereigns, the right to sue.
Were foreign governments denied this right, violators of the antitrust
laws who inflicted harm only upon overseas sovereigns would retain the
fruits of their illegality and would enjoy de facto immunity because no
one would be available to bring suit against them."
As the Supreme Court has shown time and again, it believes that
maximizing incentives to sue compels antitrust enforcement.4 Congres-
38. The private antitrust action is intended as "an ever-present threat to deter anyone
contemplating business behavior in violation of the antitrust laws." Perma Life Mufflers,
Inc. v. Int'l Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 139 (1968). As the Second Circuit recently said,
"the most important thing to keep in mind is the result orientation with which the Court
has approached the whole area of private treble-damage litigation." West Virginia v.
Chas. Pfizer & Co., 440 F.2d 1079, 1087 (2d Cir. 1971), aff'd by an equally divided Court,
404 U.S. 548 (1972).
39. See, e.g., Mulvey v. Samuel Goldwyn Productions, 433 F.2d 1073, 1075 (9th Cir.
1970).
40. The Supreme Court used similar reasoning when it severely limited use of the
"passing-on" defense in antitrust suits, noting that if the defense were permitted gener-
ally, "those who violate the antitrust laws by price fixing or monopolizing would retain
the fruits of their illegality because no one [would be] available who would bring suit
against them." Hanover Shoe Inc. v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 392 U.S. 481, 494
(1968).
41. Even complainants who are themselves antitrust violators in pari delicto with the
defendants they sue, for example, may obtain treble-damage recoveries. Perma Life Muf-
flers, Inc. v. Int'l Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134 (1968). The Court noted in Perma Life that
giving antitrust violators the right to sue does not encourage antitrust violations since the
plaintiffs still remain civilly and criminally liable for their own conduct. Thus, countries
such as Kuwait and Iran should not be denied standing to sue in antitrust actions because
of their membership in cartels such as OPEC which harm the United States. Cf. statement
of Attorney General Levi in Justice Studying Foreign Price-Fixing, Possible Violations of
U.S. Antitrust Laws, BNA ANwrrRa. & TRADE REo. REP., No. 725, A-12 (Aug. 5, 1975).
Another example of the Court's willingness to maximize the incentive to sue can be
19751
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sional intent with respect to enforcing the antitrust laws will be most
effectively implemented by maximizing inducements to curb antitrust
violators.
2. The Webb-Pomerene Act
Maximizing antitrust enforcement as the rationale for permitting for-
eign sovereigns the right to redress antitrust violations is undercut some-
what by the existence of and policies behind the Webb-Pomerene Act
of 1918.42 A supplement to the original antitrust laws, the Webb-
Pomerene Act permits United States corporations to combine and act
monopolistically under certain circumstances in foreign trade dealings
without being subject to the prohibitions of the antitrust laws.43
The Webb-Pomerene Act, enacted shortly after the Clayton Act, can
certainly be considered part of the "legislative environment" of the
Clayton Act and thus must be considered when interpreting whether
foreign sovereigns are allowed to maintain treble-damage actions. 4 The
rationale and legislative history of the Webb-Pomerene Act reveal
United States antitrust law as not entirely noble in its quest to foster
free competition and low prices. Some elements of mercantilism are
found in Simpson v. Union Oil Co. of Calif., 396 U.S. 13 (1969), in which the Court allowed
the plaintiff treble damages even though liability hinged on a new principle of law first
announced earlier in the same litigation.
42. 15 U.S.C. §§ 61-65 (1970).
43. 15 U.S.C. § 62 (1970) states that the Sherman Act does not declare illegal "an
association entered into for the sole purpose of engaging in export trade, . . . or an
agreement made or act done in the course of export trade by such association," provided
the association does not restrain trade within the United States.
44. The "legislative environment" is the basis from which the word "person" includes
a state or the United States. Georgia v. Evans, 316 U.S. 159, 161, citing Ohio v. Helvering,
292 U.S. 360, 370 (1934). See text accompanying note 19 supra for the elements constitut-
ing the legislative environment of the antitrust laws.
Twenty-five years ago, Judge Wyzanski illuminated the policies behind the Webb-
Pomerene Act as well as defined its scope:
Now it may very well be that every successful export company does inevitably
affect the foreign commerce of those not in the joint enterprise and does bring the
members of the enterprise so closely together as to affect adversely the members'
competition in domestic commerce. Thus every export company may be a re-
straint. But if there are only these inevitable consequences an export association
is not an unlawful restraint. The Webb-Pomerene Act is an expression of Congres-
sional will that such a restraint shall be permitted. And the courts are required
to give as ungrudging support to the policy of the Webb-Pomerene as to the policy
of the Sherman Act. Statutory eclecticism is not a proper judicial function.
United States v. Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co., 92 F. Supp. 947, 965 (D. Mass. 1950). THE
REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO STUDY THE ANTITRUST LAWS
113-14 (1955) urged retention of the Webb-Pomerene Act. A dissenting view asserted that
the Webb-Pomerene Act is antithetical to the Sherman Act, capable of being abused, and
of little aid to U.S. business. Id. at 114.
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present;45 the Webb-Pomerene Act was passed "to aid and encourage
our manufacturers and producers to extend our foreign trade."46 Con-
gress desired U.S. corporations to compete with powerful cartels on an
equal basis, and thus tolerated monopolistic practices under Webb-
Pomerene so long as domestic interests were not affected.
The dominant theme of the congressional debates over the bill was
that American corporations should get the highest prices possible for
their products overseas, regardless of what foreigners were made to
pay. 7 Some comments of the bill's sponsors, therefore, could be read to
mean that foreign suitors should not be protected. Senator Pomerene
acknowledged:
[W]e have not reached that high plane of business morals which will
permit us to extend the same privileges to the people of the earth outside
of the United States that we extend to those within the United States. 6
Congressman Webb candidly declared:
I would be willing that there should be a combination between anybody
or anything for the purpose of capturing the trade of the world, if they
do not punish the people of the United States in doing it.4
In this charged atmosphere of the early years of the antitrust laws it is
conceivable that Congress had not intended foreign sovereigns to be
antitrust suitors under the Clayton Act.
Nevertheless, the Webb-Pomerene exception to the antitrust laws is
not a strong basis from which to launch an attack against foreign sover-
eign antitrust suitors. The exception is a limited one; it applies only to
joint associations engaging in foreign trade. Moreover, the narrow ex-
45. Perhaps more than any other limitation . .. [the Webb-Pomerene Act]
dramatizes the nationalistic perspective of the United States, and, in fact, of any
national antitrust law. It does not appear to be consistent policy to advance
steadfastly the principle of international trade liberalization, maintenance of a
competitive domestic market structure, and at the same time the exemptive,
anticompetitive provisions of the Webb-Pomerene Act. However, until there is
more evidence of the good-faith inclination of other nations to remove substantial
trade barriers, the Webb-Pomerene exemption will continue to receive strong
support in Congress from many proponents. In a system lacking international
economic strictures, individual nations are often compelled to protect their own
industry at the expense of international progress toward free trade.
E. KINTNER & M. JOELSON, AN INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST PRIMER 264-65 (1974).
46. H.R. REP. No. 1118, 64th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1916).
47. See, e.g., the comments of one Representative to the effect that "I have no sympa-
thy with what a foreigner pays for our products; I would like to see the American
manufacturer get the largest price possible .... ." Hearings on H.R. 16707 Before the
House Comm. on the Judiciary, 64th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1916).
48. 55 CONG. REC. 2787 (1917).
49. Id. at 3580.
19751
Cornell International Law Journal
emption has itself been narrowly construed. The Act, for example, has
been held not to insulate transactions initiated, controlled, and financed
by the United States when a foreign government was the nominal pur-
chaser through the Agency for International Development foreign aid
program."°
Transactions between foreign sovereigns and American corporations
involve the foreign commerce of the United States, an area subject to
United States antitrust law prohibitions absent a Webb-Pomerene asso-
ciation. Foreign corporations are entitled to maintain private antitrust
suits despite the xenophobic streak Webb-Pomerene represents,5 ' and it
is illogical to distinguish between a foreign corporation owned substan-
tially or entirely by a foreign government and the foreign sovereign
itself. Permitting the former to maintain a treble damage action and not
the latter places undue significance on the incorporation laws of foreign
countries. Denying foreign sovereigns antitrust relief would lead to the
strange anomaly of foreign sovereigns being the only juristic entity un-
able to obtain redress for federal antitrust law violations.2 Thus, the
impact of Webb-Pomerene on the foreign sovereign standing question
should be negligible.
E. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
One of the strongest arguments available to antitrust defendants who
would deny foreign sovereigns the right to maintain treble damage ac-
tions focuses upon the statutory construction of the Clayton Act. For-
eign sovereigns were not explicitly included as "persons" entitled to
section 4 relief despite the fact that foreign nations were mentioned.13
50. United States v. Concentrated Phosphate Export Ass'n, 393 U.S. 199 (1968).
51. See, e.g., Afran Trans. Co. v. Nat'l Maritime Union, 169 F. Supp. 416 (S.D.N.Y.
1958), 175 F. Supp. 285 (S.D.N.Y. 1959); Moviecolor Ltd. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 24
F.R.D. 325 (S.D.N.Y. 1959), af'd, 288 F.2d 80 (2d Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 821
(1961).
52. The present status of the law as to the right to maintain a treble-damage action
under § 4 of the Clayton Act is diagramed below:
individuals &
foreign
domestic
political
corporations subdivisions nations
Yes ? ?
Yes Yes No*
*Section 4a of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15a (1970) provides the United States with a
private actual damage remedy.
Other than the limitations imposed on the United States in the Cooper decision, see
note 21 supra and accompanying text, all juristic entities to date have been entitled to
maintain civil antitrust suits under § 4.
53. See note 15 supra and accompanying text.
[Vol. 9:137
Foreign Sovereigns' Antitrust Actions
Many federal and state court decisions have excluded the federal gov-
ernment and the states from being "persons" under various statutory
schemes on the grounds that governmental entities usually are not con-
sidered "persons" absent express designation." Such reasoning could
also be extended to foreign sovereigns.
The sovereign immunity doctrine, moreover, also lends support to the
inference that Congress did not intend foreign sovereigns to invoke the
benefits of United States antitrust law. Both the Sherman Act of 1890
and the Clayton Act of 1914 refer to private antitrust defendants as
"persons," just as they do eligible plaintiffs. "Persons" are even subject
to criminal prosecution for antitrust violations.5 When the original anti-
trust laws were enacted, the United States applied the international law
principle of sovereign immunity in the absolute sense, so that no foreign
sovereign could be a civil or criminal defendant in United States courts
for any claim or offense absent consent or waiver. Thus, it may be
54. See, e.g., Broom v. Simon, 255 F. Supp. 434 (W.D. La. 1965) (United States not a
"person" within the meaning of the Civil Rights Act and thus could not be made a
defendant in a suit thereunder); S. Union Gas Co. v. New Mexico Pub. Service Comm'n,
82 N.M. 405, 482 P.2d 913 (1971) (The United States and the State of New Mexico not
"persons" within the meaning of the New Mexico Public Utilities Act); Commissioner of
Rev. v. Arkansas State Highway Comm'n, 232 Ark. 255, 337 S.W.2d 665 (1960) (State
Highway Commission not a "person" within the meaning of the term as defined in the
Arkansas Use Tax Statute).
In United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258 (1947), the Supreme Court held
that the United States was not a "person" so as not to fall within the provisions of the
Norris-LaGuardia Act when the federal government acted as an employer when operating
the nation's coal mines in a national emergency. The Court stated that "[t]he absence
of any comparable provision extending the term to sovereign governments implies that
Congress did not desire to extend the term to them." Id. at 275.
55. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-3 (1970); 15 U.S.C. §§ 13,13a, 14 (1970); cf. 15 U.S.C. § 8 (1970).
56. Berizzi Bros. Co. v. S.S. Pesaro, 271 U.S. 562 (1926). A study of the law of sovereign
immunity reveals the existence of two conflicting approaches. According to the classical
or "absolute" theory of sovereign immunity, a sovereign cannot, without its consent, be
made a respondent in the courts of another sovereign. According to the newer or "restric-
tive" theory, the immunity of a sovereign in the courts of another country is recognized
relative to its sovereign or public acts (jure imperii), but not as to its commercial or private
acts (jure gestionis). Proponents of both theories, supported by practice, agree that sover-
eign immunity should not be claimed or granted in actions involving real property in the
forum state (diplomatic and consular property excepted) or with respect to the disposition
of property of a deceased person even though a foreign sovereign is the beneficiary.
The classical theory of sovereign immunity, at least until 1952, had been followed by
the courts of the United States, the British Commonwealth, Czechoslovakia, Estonia, and
probably Poland. See Letter from the Acting Legal Advisor of the Department of State to
the Department of Justice, May 19, 1952, 26 DEP'T STATE BuLL. 984 (1952) (also known as
the "Tate Letter"). As a result of the 1952 Tate Letter, the United States prospectively
adopted the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity. See Note, Proposed Draft Legisla-
tion on the Sovereign Immunity of Foreign Governments: An Attempt to Revest the
Courts With a Judicial Function, 69 Nw. U.L. Rav. 302 (1974).
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reasonable to assume that Congress chose not to include foreign sover-
eigns as antitrust "persons" because when the original antitrust laws
were enacted foreign sovereigns could not be made antitrust defen-
dants. 7
On the other hand, it is apparent that section one of the Clayton Act
was not exclusive in its definition of who are "persons" for antitrust
purposes. Congress' use of the word "include" in the statutory lan-
guage5" is strong indication that the statute should be broadly inter-
preted. Obviously the statute is not limited to associations and corpora-
tions because individuals may assert antitrust claims; conceivably, for-
eign sovereigns as well fall within its broad scope. This view is supported
by the definition of "person" in the Antitrust Civil Process Act, 9 a
subsequently enacted statute which complements the original antitrust
laws in many respects and includes in its definition of "person" any
"other legal entity not a natural person" besides corporations, associa-
tions, and partnerships."0 While this definition clearly includes foreign
sovereigns, it does not appear that the Antitrust Civil Process Act at-
tempted to broaden the scope of those eligible to sue under the antitrust
laws."'
Arguably, the words "any person" appearing in section 4 of the Clay-
ton Act evidence an intent by Congress to confer a remedy upon every
juristic entity injured by the antitrust laws. The term "any person" has
been broadly interpreted; as the Supreme Court has pointed out,
"[t]he Act is comprehensive in its terms and coverage, protecting all
who are made victims of the forbidden practices by whomever they may
be perpetrated." 2 Under this expansive view, foreign sovereigns may
well be included as permissible plaintiffs under the statute.
F. POLITICAL AND DIPLOMATIC CONSIDERATIONS
The issue of whether foreign governments may assert antitrust claims
57. Cf. Georgia v. Evans, 316 U.S. 159, 163 (1942) (Roberts, J., dissenting): "If the word
'person' is to include a State as plaintiff, it must equally include it as a defendant or else
the language used is meaningless." See also United States v. Cooper Corp., 312 U.S. 600,
607 (1941): "It is fair to assume that the term 'person,' in the absence of an indication to
the contrary, was employed by the Congress throughout the Act in the same, and not in
different senses."
58. 15 U.S.C. § 12, para. 3 (1970). See note 15 supra and accompanying text.
59. 15 U.S.C. § 1311 et seq. (1970).
60. 15 U.S.C. § 1311(f) (1970).
61. The Supreme Court stated in United States v. Freeman, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 556, 564-
65 (1845) that when construing a statute a court may resort not only to contemporaneous
and prior acts of a legislature, but also to subsequent acts of the legislature in pari materia
for the purpose of ascertaining the intention or meaning of an earlier statute.
62. Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. Am. Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219, 236 (1948)
(citations omitted).
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in United States courts also touches upon sensitive issues of interna-
tional relations. Courts of the United States generally have abstained
from foreign policy meddling as exemplified by the judicially-created
Act of State Doctrine, the judiciary's view that the courts are bound by
executive assertions of immunity, and the great weight given to execu-
tive interpretations of international law.6 3 It is the political branches of
the federal government, not the judiciary, which form, implement, and
fund our nation's foreign policy activities. This preeminence in foreign
affairs is rooted in both the Constitution" and the deference tradition-
ally accorded co-equal branches of government. 5 The judiciary has
sought to avoid embarrassing the political branches in world affairs
through non-interference. In the words of Professor Lewis Henkin:
Thanks to both constitutional and political limitations, the para-
mount judicial prerogative of invalidating acts of the political branches
have not loomed large in the conduct of foreign relations.66
Policy considerations, therefore, play an important role in determin-
ing whether or not to accord foreign governments the right to sue. The
judiciary, it can be argued, should maintain a posture not inconsistent
with our nation's foreign policy, and a decision in favor of foreign sover-
eign suitors would mean that the courts would have taken an initiative
in this area of international relations which may later cause embarrass-
ment to the other, more internationally visible, branches. For example,
were Congress later to decide, perhaps at the behest of the President,
that foreign governments should be denied the right to maintain treble
damage antitrust actions, such an overt act directed against other na-
tions could conceivably result in severe diplomatic ramifications. No
such embarrassment would result if the courts took the opposite position
and ruled against the right to sue under the present statutory scheme.
On the other hand, assuming the courts ruled against the foreign sover-
eigns and Congress wanted to give foreign sovereigns a treble damage
or actual damage remedy (such as Congress provided the federal govern-
ment after Cooper), it would be a small matter to enact overriding or
modifying legislation. Such congressional action could only enhance
United States esteem throughout the international community.
By denying foreign sovereigns civil antitrust remedies, the courts
could ensure that the opportunity to establish foreign policy initiatives
63. L. HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CoNsTrrUTIoN 207 (1972).
64. Judicial acquiescence in many areas of foreign affairs such as abiding by execu-
tive interpretations of the Act of State Doctrine is said to have "constitutional underpin-
nings" because it arises out of "the basic relations between branches of government in a
system of separation of powers." Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 423
(1964).
65. HENKIN, supra note 63, at 206-209.
66. Id. at 206-207. See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
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effectively remains with those constitutionally authorized as well as
most capable of making such decisions. Conceivably, a ruling adverse
to the foreign sovereign suitors, especially in light of the absence of
explicit congressional resolve on this issue, would be the most neutral
and prudent course.
For the foreign governments, on the other hand, it could be effectively
argued that while political and diplomatic considerations often play an
important role in shaping judicial decisions, the foreign sovereign anti-
trust issue does not mandate a protectionist approach. Judicial defer-
ence to the. political branches generally occurs when a treaty is being
interpreted or when sovereign immunity is at issue. When the rights of
individual aggrieved parties require resolution, the courts have not hesi-
tated to decide such controversies on their merits despite the fact that
delicate foreign relations may be intimately connected." It is highly
probable that there is no basic conflict between protecting United States
interests and allowing foreign sovereigns private antitrust remedies.
Moreover, the nation can be embarrassed by judicial decisions holding
against foreign sovereign standing as easily as it can by specific legisla-
tive prohibition. 8
While foreign sovereign antitrust suits ostensibly involve hard foreign
policy considerations, such factors are not novel to the development of
United States antitrust law. Cases in which a domestic corporation sues
a foreign corporation, which would seem to involve far more difficult
problems of foreign policy, are allowed. 9 Hence, a fortiori, foreign policy
should not play a significant role against the standing of foreign govern-
ments to maintain private antitrust actions under United States law.
67. HENKIN, supra note 63, at 207-208. Professor Henkin cites such examples as a com-
pany challenging the validity or application of a tariff, a soldier seeking to enjoin the
Secretary of Defense from sending him to Vietnam, and review of the foreign activities of
the Departments of Commerce and Treasury.
68. A judicial declaration against foreign sovereign antitrust suits may appear to the
world as an arbitrary and unfriendly act based more upon political considerations than
upon legal principle. Moreover, the various treaties which the United States has signed
with other nations indicate that a holding against foreign sovereign suitors would impede
their thrust. See, e.g., Treaty with Iran on Amity, Economic Relations and Consular
Rights, Aug. 15, 1955, [1957] 1 U.S.T. 899, T.I.A.S. No. 3853; Treaty with Vietnam on
Amity and Economic Relations, April 3, 1961, [1961] 2 U.S.T. 1703, T.I.A.S. No. 4890.
(Of course, due to the fact that the new government of South Vietnam is presently unre-
cognized by the U.S. it is unable to maintain a law suit in U.S. fora. See note 18 supra.)
69. See Calnetics Corp. v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 353 F. Supp. 1219 (C.D. Cal. 1973);
United States v. Standard Oil Co., 1970 TnADz CAS. T 72,988 (N.D. Ohio 1970). See British
Nylon Spinners, Ltd. v. Imperial Chemical Industries, Ltd., [1952] 2 All E.R. 780 (C.A.)
and British Nylon Spinners, Ltd. v. Imperial Chemical Industries, Ltd., [1954] 3 All E.R.
88 (Ch.). In the British cases one corporation sued another in British courts to enjoin the
defendant from complying with an antitrust judgment rendered by a United States court
in United States v. Imperial Chemical Industries, Ltd., 105 F. Supp. 215 (S.D.N.Y. 1952).
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CONCLUSION
Arguments against permitting foreign sovereigns the right to maintain
private antitrust actions in the United States are not compelling in light
of the overall purposes behind private antitrust actions. Deterrence from
committing antitrust violations would be lessened if foreign sovereigns
were barred from asserting private antitrust actions in the federal
courts. Foreign governments closely resemble states of the United States
under the antitrust statutory scheme, in that both are governmental
entities which may be harmed by federal antitrust violations and have
no other way in which to seek relief. Since the latter enjoy antitrust
standing, so should the former. Any attempt to distinguish foreign sov-
ereigns from foreign corporations, which are permitted to assert treble
damage actions, places too much emphasis on the letter of the law, itself
ambiguous, while ignoring its spirit.
Whether foreign sovereigns should be granted the right to obtain pri-
vate antitrust relief in the United States is a question particularly ap-
propriate for clarification by Congress, but in the absence of express
congressional resolve, the broad scope of the present antitrust statutory
scheme lends itself admirably to having foreign sovereigns invoke its
benefits.
Phillip S. Figa
19751
